Tuesday, 9 November 2010

Genes To Brains To Minds To... Murder?

A group of Italian psychiatrists claim to explain How Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics Improve Psychiatric Assessment: Report on a Violent Murder Case.

The paper presents the horrific case of a 24 year old woman from Switzerland who smothered her newborn son to death immediately after giving birth in her boyfriend's apartment. After her arrest, she claimed to have no memory of the event. She had a history of multiple drug abuse, including heroin, from the age of 13.

Forensic psychiatrists were asked to assess her case and try to answer the question of whether "there was substantial evidence that the defendant had an irresistible impulse to commit the crime." The paper doesn't discuss the outcome of the trial, but the authors say that in their opinion she exhibits a pattern of "pathologically impulsivity, antisocial tendencies, lack of planning...causally linked to the crime, thus providing the basis for an insanity defense."

But that's not all. In the paper, the authors bring neuroscience and genetics into the case in an attempt to provide
a more “objective description” of the defendant’s mental disease by providing evidence that the disease has “hard” biological bases. This is particularly important given that psychiatric symptoms may be easily faked as they are mostly based on the defendant’s verbal report.
So they scanned her brain, and did DNA tests for 5 genes which have been previously linked to mental illness, impulsivity, or violent behaviour. What happened? Apparently her brain has "reduced gray matter volume in the left prefrontal cortex" - but that was compared to just 6 healthy control women. You really can't do this kind of analysis on a single subject, anyway.

As for her genes, well, she had genes. On the famous and much-debated 5HTTLPR polymorphism, for example, her genotype was long/short; while it's true that short is generally considered the "bad" genotype, something like 40% of white people, and an even higher proportion of East Asians, carry it. The situation was similar for the other four genes (STin2 (SCL6A4), rs4680 (COMT), MAOA-uVNTR, DRD4-2/11, for gene geeks).

I've previously posted about cases in which a well-defined disorder of the brain led to criminal behaviour. There was the man who became obsessed with child pornography following surgical removal of a tumour in his right temporal lobe. There are the people who show "sociopathic" behaviour following fronto-temporal degeneration.

However this woman's brain was basically "normal" at least as far as a basic MRI scan could determine. All the pieces were there. Her genotypes was also normal in that lots of normal people carry the same genes; it's not (as far as we know) that she has a rare genetic mutation like Brunner syndrome in which an important gene is entirely missing. So I don't think neurobiology has much to add to this sad story.

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We're willing to excuse perpetrators when there's a straightforward "biological cause" for their criminal behaviour: it's not their fault, they're ill. In all other cases, we assign blame: biology is a valid excuse, but nothing else is.

There seems to be a basic difference between the way in which we think about "biological" as opposed to "environmental" causes of behaviour. This is related, I think, to the Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations and our fascination with brain scans that "prove that something is in the brain". But when you start to think about it, it becomes less and less clear that this distinction works.

A person's family, social and economic background is the strongest known predictor of criminality. Guys from stable, affluent families rarely mug people; some men from poor, single-parent backgrounds do. But muggers don't choose to be born into that life any more than the child-porn addict chose to have brain cancer.

Indeed, the mugger's situation is a more direct cause of his behaviour than a brain tumour. It's not hard to see how a mugger becomes, specifically, a mugger: because they've grown up with role-models who do that; because their friends do it or at least condone it; because it's the easiest way for them to make money.

But it's less obvious how brain damage by itself could cause someone to seek child porn. There's no child porn nucleus in the brain. Presumably, what it does is to remove the person's capacity for self-control, so they can't stop themselves from doing it.

This fits with the fact that people who show criminal behaviour after brain lesions often start to eat and have (non-criminal) sex uncontrollably as well. But that raises the question of why they want to do it in the first place. Were they, in some sense, a pedophile all along? If so, can we blame them for that?

ResearchBlogging.orgRigoni D, Pellegrini S, Mariotti V, Cozza A, Mechelli A, Ferrara SD, Pietrini P, & Sartori G (2010). How neuroscience and behavioral genetics improve psychiatric assessment: report on a violent murder case. Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, 4 PMID: 21031162

9 comments:

Michelle Greene said...

Great post! Unfortunately, this reflects a great desire to use science to make black and white policy statements, to be able to say that someone is either 100% or 0% responsible for his actions.

Alexander Kruel said...

Diseased thinking: dissolving questions about disease

People commonly debate whether social and mental conditions are real diseases. This masquerades as a medical question, but its implications are mainly social and ethical. We use the concept of disease to decide who gets sympathy, who gets blame, and who gets treatment.

Instead of continuing the fruitless "disease" argument, we should address these questions directly. Taking a determinist consequentialist position allows us to do so more effectively. We should blame and stigmatize people for conditions where blame and stigma are the most useful methods for curing or preventing the condition, and we should allow patients to seek treatment whenever it is available and effective.


Link: http://lesswrong.com/lw/2as/diseased_thinking_dissolving_questions_about/

Neuroskeptic said...

XiXiDu: I agree with that assessment, but I don't think it'll happen; it would just be too counterintuitive.

Alexander Kruel said...

@Neuroskeptic Have you read the whole article? I'd love to know what you think.

"...it would just be too counterintuitive."

Maybe! But we should try anyhow if it is the right thing to do?

So here, at last, is a rule for which diseases we offer sympathy, and which we offer condemnation: if giving condemnation instead of sympathy decreases the incidence of the disease enough to be worth the hurt feelings, condemn; otherwise, sympathize. Though the rule is based on philosophy that the majority of the human race would disavow, it leads to intuitively correct consequences. [...] The question "Do the obese deserve our sympathy or our condemnation," then, is asking whether condemnation is such a useful treatment for obesity that its utility outweights the disutility of hurting obese people's feelings.

Mag Walls said...

I don't have access to the original article, but find it beyond bizarre that brain scans and genetic analysis were considered necessary to establish a biological basis for mental illness in a woman who had just given birth.

Why no mention of postpartum psychosis?

veri said...

Pedophilia is evil. I believe some things are just evil. It isn't something I'm willing to understand.

Were they even human in the first place?

What makes two computers so different? In terms of being, the spirit of which programmer shapes the mind?

Thanks Neo for the post, you read my mind.

Bridge Street Food & Wine said...

Two interesting questions come to mind after reading this:

1. What is it for a mental illness to have a biological basis? Given that all mental states have at least some physical correlate in the brain, i.e. brain states are the substrate of mental states, there is no compulsion nor action which does not have a corresponding change in brain state. When we say that a mental illness has a biological basis, are we saying that for a mental illness to be biological in nature, the neurochemical/neuroanatomical problem has to be primary, and to precede the cognitive aberrations?

2. If this distinction between biologically-caused and biological-substrate mental states is not meaningful, can we still hold that 'hard' mental illness carries an absolution of responsibility for action?

SleepRunning said...

Great post. The medical facts are one thing -- policy, law, morality, etc are entirely different.

We would propose that brain science presents a Copernican challenge to pretty much all beliefs systems and ideologies (neither of which we feel are bad things).

The evidence is accumulating that our conscious "selves" are not the center of much of anything. That's a shock that may never be truly accepted by the general public.

However, policy makers and other special audiences need to follow science -- which, of course, is always imperfect and wrong. It is human after all.

However, effectively no one believes the earth is not the center of the universe or any other science, especially medical science.

For example, "all mental states have at least some physical correlate in the brain"!? Where else would they be?

The advantages to policy makers is quite simple -- brain science works better than other ways to describe, explain and understand individual behavior. Aside from money, policy makers sort of like stuff that works -- sometimes.

"Popular science" is really oxymoronic.

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